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Abstract 
In settings such as electronic markets where trading partners have conflicting interests 
and a desire to cooperate, mobile agent mediated negotiation have become very popular. 
However, agent-based negotiation in electronic commerce involves the exchange of critical 
and sensitive data that must be highly safeguarded. Therefore, in order to give benefits of 
quick and safe trading to the trading partners, an approach that secures the information 
exchanged between the mobile agents during e-Commerce negotiations is needed. To this 
end, we discuss an approach that we refer to as Multi-Agent Security NEgotiation Protocol 
(MASNEP). To show that MASNEP protocol is free of attacks and thus the information 
exchanged throughout electronic negotiation is truly secured, we provide a formal proof on 
the correctness of the MASNEP.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
In on-line trading environment, goods are not necessarily traded at a fixed price, and 
instead buyers and sellers negotiate among themselves to reach a deal that maximizes 
the payoffs of the trading partners. Negotiation between agents allows cooperative and 
competitive sharing of information. The negotiation can be single attribute negotiations 
such as the purely price-based negotiation or multi- attribute negotiation that considers 
multiple parameters such as price, quality of service, shipping fees, payment method, 
warranty, etc.  When a large amount of information must be processed quickly or 
employing human traders is not cost-effective, agent mediated automated negotiations 
for electronic markets become very valuable. As a result, negotiating mobile agents that 
enable customers to search for offers from worldwide trading agents that satisfy 
predefined constraints, run multiple sessions of negotiation with the most competing 
trading agents, make a decision on the best offer, and finalize agreements on their 
behalf have been recently proposed [15].  
In the course of negotiation, the exchanged information might be subject to security 
attacks. Usually, negotiations go through many rounds, and hence are subject to 
security risks. Adversaries might reveal or tamper with any of the sensitive information 
so as to gain offers in their favor. It is essential to secure electronic negotiation (e-
Negotiation) for the success of e-Commerce and the attainment of optimum social 
welfare trading partners eagerly seek. Therefore, in an environment where mobile 
agents based negotiation, comprehensive security measures must be in place to ensure 
privacy, authentication, anonymity, strong integrity, and non-repudiation of the 
message exchanged between the mobile agents. 
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In this paper, we address the security of information exchanged between negotiating 
agents. Agent-based negotiation in e-commerce involves the exchange of critical and 
sensitive data that must be highly safeguarded. However, the security of the processes has not 
been addressed sufficiently. The MASNEP protocol [14] takes into consideration the various 
malicious acts of adversaries on the information exchanged during negotiation and preserves 
the following security properties [16]: (1) Strong integrity, non-repudiation, privacy and 
authentication of collected offers. (2) Privacy of parameters to negotiate with each of the 
short listed vendors. (3) Anonymity of identities of trading partners (customer and negotiated 
vendors. (4) Privacy of the customer's bank account details. (5) Non-repudiation of purchase 
orders and payment orders. (6) Strong integrity of the details of Request For Offer RFO such 
as the closing time of RFO. 
The proposed protocol implements the following security techniques:  
a. Utilization of multi-agents, each is responsible of a specific task and their 
results should be incorporated so a decision can be made on the 
service/resources to buy.  
b. Implementation of cryptography to ensure security of exchanged information. 
c. Assigning a trusted host the processes of verifications, sorting, negotiations, 
and decision making. 
We verify the protocol using STA (Symbolic Trace Analyzer), an infinite-state 
exploration formal method. Formal methods have been used in the design and reasoning 
about the correctness of security protocols [19]. They help in developing error-free 
security protocols. Actually, formal methods have revealed subtle flaws in the existing 
protocols and showed their failure to accomplish some or all of the asserted properties 
[1, 4, 6, 8, 9].  The STA [18] models a protocol as a system of concurrent processes, 
using syntax analogous to the syntax of Spi-calculus [10]. It is based on symbolic 
techniques. The protocol is verified for the following security properties: privacy, 
authenticity, anonymity, non-repudiation and strong integrity. The verification showed 
that the proposed protocol is free of security flaws.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the background to 
electronic market and agent-based negotiation is described. A brief discussion of the 
security properties and threats to information exchanged between agents during e-
negotiation is presented. The proposed protocol is described in details in section 3. In 
section 4, the STA and formal methods of analysis are discussed. The formal analysis of 
the proposed protocol using STA is described in section 5. In section 6, we summarize 
our contributions in a conclusion and discuss future directions of this work. 
 
2. Background 
An electronic negotiation is a joint decision-making process of two or more parties within 
an electronic market. An electronic market is an application that is based on electronic 
communication services and that supports the market coordination of economic activities. 
Mobile agents might negotiate for terms of agreements, allocation of complex tasks among 
multi-agents in e-markets, services or resource, and attributes of collected offers [15]. 
Generally, an initiator agent starts a negotiating session by sending out an agent with a 
Request for Offer (RFO) including initiator's preferences e.g. price range and a potential 
negotiation strategy, constraints and a closing time for bid. Vendors submit their offers to 
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meet the initiator's preferences and constraints and set an expiry time of their respective 
offers. The negotiating agent interacts with vendors and other agents, receives, analyzes, 
evaluates, and ranks offers autonomously, and then negotiates certain parameters with short 
listed vendors and other agents till they congregate an agreement or abort the negotiation. The 
agent potentially could consummate the deal on the consumer's behalf without the need to 
return to the initiator. It tries to reach individual's optimal social welfare through rounds of 
negotiation with the short listed vendors. Once it decides on the winning vendor, it commits 
to its proposal and sends a payment order to the customer's bank. 
During negotiation, agents are expected to transport through insecure channels and run on 
non-trusted hosts. Thus, both intruders and non-trusted hosts might perform any of the 
following fraudulent acts [12, 13, 15, 16]: (a)  spy out information about the collected offers 
or confidential issues of agreements, (b) truncate or delete an offer of a competing vendor, (c) 
append a fake offer and then repudiate it, (d) sign others' offer with its private key, (e) tamper 
with collected offer/s, (f)  replace its submitted offer with a new competing offer, (g) spy out 
the initiator's bank account details, (h) spy out parameters of a collected offer, (i) disclose 
identity of the customer/ initiator, (j) disclose identities of negotiated vendors, (k) spy out 
and/ or tamper with parameters to negotiate with short listed vendors, (l) tamper with 
parameters of Request for Offer (FRO), bid closing time, identity of initiator, random nonce 
identifying a protocol run, and (m) Tamper with a payment/purchase order. 
It is fundamental to ensure the security of information exchanged during e-negotiation, 
particularly the negotiated parameters. The security refers to the following properties:  
 Privacy refers to the privacy of exchanged information during the negotiation 
sessions. An adversary should not be able to reveal any of the following: (1) 
Details of an offer submitted by a visited vendor. (2) Parameters the agent intends 
to negotiate with short listed vendors. (3) Customer's bank account details. 
 Non-repudiation refers to the availability of a proof on: (1) Identity of the vendor 
that submitted an offer. (2) Identity of customer that made a purchase order or 
payment order. 
 Authentication refers to the ability of the agent to determine accurately the identity 
of the vendor that signed an offer. 
 Strong integrity refers to the ability of the agent to prevent or at least detect any 
tampering with: (1) Data the agent has collected during its itinerary, such as 
deletion or manipulation. (2) Bid details, such as closing time. 
 Anonymity refers to the ability to obscure an intruder or malicious host from 
revealing the identities of participants in the negotiation, e.g. customer and 
negotiated vendors. 
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3. Multi-Agent Security Negotiation Protocol 
In this section, we briefly describe the Multi-Agent Security NEgotiation Protocol 
(MASNEP) that aims to protect the information exchanged by negotiating agents. The 
protocol uses three mobile agents: controller agent, worker agent, and itinerary registry agent. 
The controller agent stores the critical data and functions, such as scoring functions, decision 
functions, offer vector and part of the tactic function. The worker agent stores the non- critical 
data/functions such as part of the tactic function. The itinerary registry agent stores the 
address of each visited vendor and the corresponding time at which the agent got executed. In 
addition, the protocol allocates a trusted service the role of a mediator where the negotiating 
agent can securely evaluates submitted offers, sets parameters for negotiation, makes final 
decision, issues purchase orders, and issuing requests bank orders. The information collected 
by the three agents is to be integrated and verified before being accepted and a decision is 
made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Itinerary of the three agents in MASNEP protocol 
 
The protocol uses certain parameters to ensure accurate verifications such as random nonce 
to identify a protocol run, time of execution of the agent at a vendor's host, and hashing of the 
identity of the initiator. Public encryption and private signature keys are used to achieve 
privacy, strong integrity, anonymity, non-repudiation, and authentication properties of 
exchanged information. The itinerary of the three proposed agents contributing in the 
negotiation processes of e-Commerce application is shown in Figure 1.  
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The assumptions and detailed description of the protocol is given in [14]. The protocol can 
be outlined into the three phases: the first phase of protocol includes planning, bidding, 
collecting, opening, ranking, and evaluating offers; the second phase of protocol includes 
negotiating the most competing vendors, collecting new offers, opening, ranking, and 
evaluating offers, and finally making a decision on the winning vendor; and the third Phase of 
protocol includes sending a purchase order to the awarded vendor, waiting for an acceptance 
from the vendor, issuing a payment order, and receiving service or resource. 
 
 
4. Analysis of Multi-Agent Security Negotiation Protocol 
Formal methods have played an important role in specifying, verifying, and revealing 
unforeseen flaws in security protocols. They provide rigorous analysis for the system design, 
and for establishing its correctness and reliability. Thus, they help in developing error-free 
security protocols [7]. Formal methods have been used to verify information security 
protocols of mobile agents [10, 13, 18, 19]. The existing formal methods are: Modal logic, 
Finite-state exploration, Theorem proving, Modal algebra, and Infinite-state exploration [7].  
We verify the MASNEP protocol using STA formal method. STA is an infinite-state 
exploration verification method [18] which analyzes the execution traces of the system to 
detect possible faults of security properties of the protocol. However, searching all execution 
traces for insecure state starting from an initial configuration may result in a search of infinite 
transitions. The STA introduces a transition relation →s that condenses infinite transitions to a 
single symbolic transition, where each input action should be preceded by a corresponding 
action. So, STA does not suffer from state explosion problem [10].  
STA is developed by Boreale and Buscemi [11]. It can perform a complete exploration of 
the whole infinite-state model generated by a finite set of participants. It detects the flaws in 
Needham-Schroeder, Yahalom, Otway-Rees, and Kerberos protocols [10, 18]. The analysis of 
Needham-Shroeder and Kerberos protocols with STA in [18] and with Murϕ in [3] shows the 
advantages of using symbolic methods over finite-state exploration methods. 
We use the STA formal method in the analysis of the proposed protocol as it is 
characterized by the following: 
 It avoids the state explosion problem: The analysis of execution traces in STA is based 
on symbolic techniques. 
 It does not require expert guidance: Modeling and verifying the system is simple and 
straightforward, whereas the theorem proving methods are time consuming and require 
a lot of expertise [2, 5]. 
 It does not need to model the intruder explicitly: The intruder is represented by the 
environment’s initial knowledge, e.g. an intercepted message. It does require modeling 
the intruder explicitly. 
 The verification is automatic: Automatic verification saves time as compared to 
methods which require hand-written proofs, such as the methods based on modal logic 
or process algebra. 
According to Boreale and Gorla in [10], a protocol in STA is modeled as a system of 
concurrent processes and a state of the system is modeled as a pair 〈s, P〉 called configuration. 
The s is a trace of past I/O actions that results from interaction between a process and its 
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environment, and represents the current intruder’s knowledge. The P is a Spi-calculus term 
that describes the intended behavior of honest participants. Table 1 describes the STA syntax. 
 
Table 1.  Syntax of STA 
A! M  An output action 
A? x an input action 
Stop A terminated process 
>> A sequence of actions 
P1 || P2 A parallel composition of the processes P1 and P2 
^+K A public encryption key 
+SigK A digital signing key 
(M is N) an equality test of the terms M and N 
(M1, M2)  A pairing of the terms M1 and M2 
hsh(M) A hash of the term M 
M pkdecr(x, -K) A decryption of the message M with the decryption 
key –K and then binding the result to variable x  
M pkdecr(x, -SigK) A decryption of the message M with the signature 
verification key −SigK and then binding the result to 
the variable x 
In the STA, the protocol can be specified using the four kinds of declarations [17]  as 
summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. STA declarations 
Identifiers 
Named 
Variables 
Labels 
 
DecName $ K1, K2, … , Km $;  
DecVar $ x1, x2, … , xr $; 
DecLabel $ a1, a2, … , an $;  
Processes val Pr = P; 
Configuration val Conf = (L @ Pr); 
Properties val Prop = (A ← B); 
 
 
5. Modeling and verifying the protocol 
The verification is carried out for an instance of the MASNEP protocol. We analyze a 
model of a limited number of participants as the execution slows down as the number of 
participants and the associated number of identifiers increases [11]. The model also allows for 
the analysis of colluding attacks. It consists of a consumer (initiator), three vendors, trusted 
host, and bank service I, V1, V2, V3, TS, and BS respectively. Vendors V1 and V3 might be 
colluding hosts trying to amend the data they already provided, delete the data acquired at the 
intermediate vendor V2, spy out the collected data, or insert arbitrary data. Also, vendors V1, 
V2, or V3 can be malicious hosts trying individually to truncate trailing data, append arbitrary 
data, or impersonate the genuine consumer to spy out confidential data. The selected model 
size would improve efficiency in terms of execution time, memory occupation, and execution 
traces.  
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Figure 2: Declarations of Sys, Conf, and roles of I and V2 
Due to space limitations, only particular declarations are given in the paper: Processes’ 
declarations of iI and ven2 at hosts I, and V2 respectively; System’s declaration Sys; and 
Configuration’s declaration Conf. The system Sys is declared as: (1) A parallel composition of 
the role of participating hosts and their respective public keys. (2) A ‘guardian’ that can detect 
if the environment learns some piece of sensible information, like y. The initial configuration 
Conf of the system consists of: (1) Initial environment’s knowledge where the ‘disclose!’ 
action leaks information to the environment. (2) Role of the system Sys. The declarations are 
depicted in Figure 2. 
Here, only the verifications of data exchanged between the initiator and vendor V3 are 
shown expressed in STA. The verifications are as follows. 
 val Secrecy1 = (Absurd <−− guard?I); (1) 
 val Secrecy4 = (Absurd <−− guard?V3); (2) 
 val Secrecy5 = (Absurd <-- guard?Ad); (3) 
 val Secrecy8 = (Absurd <-- guard?Ma3); (4) 
 val Secrecy11 = (Absurd <−− guard?Mb3); (5)
 val Secrecy14 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mc3); (6) 
 val Secrecy17 = (Absurd <−− guard?T3);  (7) 
 val Secrecy20 = (Absurd <−− guard?Tv3); (8) 
 val Secrecy23 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'a3); (9) 
 val Secrecy26 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'b3); (10) 
 val Secrecy29 = (Absurd <-- guard?M'c3); (11) 
 val Secrecy32 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mma3); (12) 
 val Secrecy34 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mmb3); (13) 
 val Secrecy36 = (Absurd <-- guard?Mmc3); (14) 
(*Processes at initiator I) 
val iI =  RFO new_in R new_in T new_in Ad new_in 
        i1!((( RFO, R, T, Ad)^+SigI)^+KTS, (RFO, R, T, hsh(I), KTS)) >> stop; 
(* Processes at vendor V2)                      
val ven2 =  Tv2 new_in Ma2 new_in Mb2 new_in Mc2 new_in T2 new_in 
            b1?((( yRFO, yR, yT, yAd)^+SigI)^+KTS, (yRFO, yR, yT, yI, KTS) , 
               ((yV1, yR, yI, yTv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
((yMa1, yMb1, yMc1, yR, yI, yT1)^+SigV1)^+KTS) >> 
       b2!((( yRFO, yR, yT, yAd)^+SigI)^+KTS, (yRFO, yR, yT, yI, KTS), 
             ((yV1, yR, yI, yTv1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
 ((yMa1, yMb1, yMc1, yR, yI, yT1)^+SigV1)^+KTS,  
               ((V2, yR, yI, Tv2)^+SigV2)^+KTS,  
 ((Ma2, Mb2, Mc2, yR, yI, T2)^+SigV2)^+KTS) >> stop; 
val Sys =  KV1 new_in KV2 new_in KV3 new_in KTS new_in KBS new_in KI new_in 
iI||ven1||ven2||ven3||hTS||bank||guard?y >> stop; 
val Conf =   ([disclose!(Rold, +KI, +KV1, +KV2, +KV3, +KTS, +KBS, 
             SigI, -SigV1, -SigV2, -SigV3, -SigTS)]@Sys); 
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 val Secrecy38 = (Absurd <-- guard?T'3);(15) 
 val Secrecy40 = (Absurd <-- guard?T'v3); (16) 
 val Auth3 = (c1?(((w)^+SigI)^+KTS, z, x, u) Å i1!(((w')^+SigI)^+KTS, z, x, u)); (17) 
val Auth6 = (s1?(w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, ((w7)^+SigV3)^+KTS, 
((w8)^+SigV3)^+KTS) Å c2!(w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6,  
((w7')^+SigV3)^+KTS, ((w8')^+SigV3)^+KTS)); (18) 
val Auth8 = (s3?(w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8,  
((w9)^+SigV3)^+KTS, ((w10)^+SigV3)^+KTS) Å  
c4!(w1, w2, w3, w4, w5, w6, w7, w8,  
((w9')^+SigV3)^+KTS, ((w10')^+SigV3)^+KTS)); (19) 
 val Auth9 = (d1?(((w)^+SigTS)^+KBS) Å s6!(((w)^+SigTS)^+KBS)); (20) 
 val Auth10 = (c5?(((w)^+SigTS)^+KV3) Å s4!(((w)^+SigTS)^+KV3)); (21) 
 
Secrecy1 in (1) verifies anonymity of the initiator. Secrecy3 in (2) verifies anonymity of 
vendor V3. Secrecy5 in (3) verifies secrecy of the initiator's bank account details. Secrecy8, 
Secrecy11, and Secrecy14 in (4), (5), and (6) verify the privacy of the details of the offer of 
vendor V3. Secrecy17 in (7) verifies privacy of expiry time of the offer of vendor V3. 
Secrecy20 in (8) verifies privacy of the execution time of the agent at the host of vendor V3. 
Secrecy23, Secrecy26, and Secrecy29 in (9), (10), and (11) verify secrecy of the terms to 
negotiate with vendor V3 in the second round of protocol. Secrecy32, Secrecy34, and 
Secrecy36 in (12), (13), and (14) verify secrecy of details of the new offer of negotiated 
vendor V3. Secrecy38 in (15) verifies secrecy of the expiry time of the new offer of vendor 
V3. Secrecy40 in (16) verifies secrecy of the execution time of the agent at a vendor V3 
visited in the second round of protocol. Auth3 in (17) verifies that the Request for Offer that 
vendor V3 received has truly originated from initiator I. Auth6 in (18) verifies that the offer 
the trusted host received has truly originated from vendor V3. If it passes, then it concludes 
that the vendor V3 cannot repudiate an offer that has truly originated from it. Auth8 in (19) 
verifies integrity and authenticity of offer the trusted host received in the second round of 
protocol. Auth9 in (20) verifies that the payment order the bank received has truly originated 
from the trusted host TS. If it passes, then it concludes the trusted host cannot repudiate it. 
Auth10 in (21) verifies authenticity of purchase order the winning vendor received. 
The full specifications, verifications of the protocol can be found in [14]. The verification 
of security properties: authenticity, strong integrity, privacy, non-repudiation, and anonymity 
of information exchanged during e-negotiation using STA reported no attacks. Figure 3 
shows the results of verifying the proposed protocol and reports the reached symbolic 
configurations for the proposed protocol. Hence, we would deduce that the protocol is free of 
security flaws. 
 
> val it = 
    "No attack was found  17186 symbolic configurations reached; 3.8130 seconds    
elapsed."   : string 
Figure 3. Result of verifying the proposed protocol using STA tool 
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5. Conclusion and Future Directions 
In this paper, we verified our protocol MASNEP [14] that addresses the security of 
information exchanged during e-Negotiation using STA, infinite state exploration method. 
The protocol asserts the security properties: anonymity, privacy, non-repudiation, 
authenticity, and strong integrity. An instance of the protocol is modeled and verified for the 
security properties. The analysis showed that the protocol is free of attacks. The result 
motivates a proof on correctness of a general model of the protocol. The protocol would 
enhance trust in e-Negotiation and lead to optimal social welfare. The future works is to 
verify the protocol formally using other formal verification methods such as SPIN model 
checker, or Murϕ and compare results of analysis and present additional proof that the 
proposed protocol is free of security attacks. 
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